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Research is increasingly challenging the claim that distinct sources of social
information—such as sex, race, and emotion—are processed in discrete fashion. Instead,
there appear to be functionally relevant interactions that occur. In the present article, we
describe research examining how cues conveyed by the human face, voice, and body
interact to form the unified representations that guide our perceptions of and responses to
other people. We explain how these information sources are often thrown into interaction
through bottom-up forces (e.g., phenotypic cues) as well as top-down forces (e.g.,
stereotypes and prior knowledge). Such interactions point to a person perception process
that is driven by an intimate interface between bottom-up perceptual and top-down
social processes. Incorporating data from neuroimaging, event-related potentials (ERP),
computational modeling, computer mouse-tracking, and other behavioral measures, we
discuss the structure of this interface, and we consider its implications and adaptive
purposes. We argue that an increased understanding of person perception will likely
require a synthesis of insights and techniques, from social psychology to the cognitive,
neural, and vision sciences.
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With only a fleeting glimpse, a constellation of near-instant judg-
ments are often made about another person. Although frequently
warned not to “judge a book by its cover,” our tendency to
make meaning out of the sensory information availed by others
is typically beyond our conscious control. From minimal cues
afforded by the face, voice, and body, we unwittingly infer the
intentions, thoughts, personalities, emotions, and category mem-
berships (e.g., sex, race, and age) of those around us. While some
of these judgments may be expectancy-driven and biased by our
stereotypes (Brewer, 1988; Fiske and Neuberg, 1990; Macrae and
Bodenhausen, 2000), others may be surprisingly accurate and
expose humans’ exquisite ability to perceive other people from
only the briefest of observations (Ambady et al., 2000; Willis and
Todorov, 2006).
This astounding ability to perceive other people, however, is
plagued by a basic contradiction. As readily and rapidly as we may
dispel our judgments of others, each judgment requires an aston-
ishing complexity of mental processing. Despite their complexity,
however, they occur with remarkable ease. From a single face,
for example, any numbers of perceptions (e.g., sex and emotion)
are immediately available, but each requires the integration of an
enormous amount of information. Unlike objects, other people
are highly complex stimuli, embedded in a rich set of contexts
and grounded in multiple sensory modalities. All the features and
configural properties of a person’s face must be bound together,
along with that person’s hair and array of bodily cues. Auditory
cues of a person’s voice are available as well, and these must be
bound together with the person’s visual cues to form a coherent
social percept. Such a complexity of bottom-up sensory informa-
tion is matched, however, by a similar complexity in top-down
information sources that are uniquely present in person percep-
tion. For example, people bring a great deal of prior knowledge,
stereotypic expectations, and affective and motivational states to
the process of perceiving others. The influences of these top-down
factors may often seep down into the perceptual process itself.
How does such a vast array of information—both bottom-up
and top-down—rapidly conspire to drive perception in the very
short time it takes to arrive at an instant judgment of another
person?
In this article, we first provide background on person per-
ception from the perspective of social psychology followed by
background from the perspective of the cognitive, vision, and
neural sciences. We then describe how these literatures have
traditionally converged on the argument for non-interactive pro-
cessing of different category dimensions. We then discuss more
recent evidence for category interactions, either through top-
down (e.g., driven by stereotypic expectations) or bottom-up
(e.g., driven by perceptual cues) mechanisms. Finally, we explain
how a recent framework and model of person perception can
capture such effects and potentially yield a clearer picture of
person perception. When then finish with some concluding
remarks.
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SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY ON PERSON PERCEPTION
If person perception is characterized, on the one hand, by
being highly complex, and on the other by being highly effi-
cient, social psychological research has historically placed a great
deal of focus on the latter. Seminal work in social psychol-
ogy by Allport (1954), Sherif (1967), and Tajfel (1969), for
example, argued that individuals perceive others via sponta-
neous, perhaps inevitable, category-based impressions that are
highly efficient and designed to economize on mental resources.
Since then, a vast array of studies has demonstrated that such
category-based impressions bring about a host of cognitive,
affective, and behavioral outcomes. Mere activation of a social
category, it has been shown, readily changes how individuals
think about others, feel about them, and behave toward them,
often in ways that may operate non-consciously (e.g., Brewer,
1988; Devine, 1989; Fiske and Neuberg, 1990; Gilbert and Hixon,
1991; Bargh, 1994, 1999; Fazio et al., 1995; Dovidio et al., 1997;
Sinclair and Kunda, 1999). A strong emphasis in social psychol-
ogy, therefore, has been to document the downstream impli-
cations of person categorization and its myriad outcomes for
social interaction.
With a focus on subsequent interpersonal phenomena, a
clear research strategy emerged in the literature. Often, a sin-
gle category of interest would be isolated (e.g., race) and its
influences on subsequent behavior measured, while all other
categories were controlled (e.g., sex, age, and emotion). This
afforded tremendous insights into the downstream dynamics
of single categorizations, but it lacked breadth in understand-
ing the complexity of real-world categorization. In reality, social
targets may be categorized along any number of possible dimen-
sions. Of the many potential categories, then, which get the
privilege of perceivers’ processing, and which are thrown aside?
A prevalent answer to this question has been that one cate-
gory (e.g., race) comes to dominate perception, while all others
(e.g., sex and age) are inhibited from working memory (Macrae
et al., 1995; Sinclair and Kunda, 1999). Presumably, this cat-
egory selection process makes the perceiver’s job easier (e.g.,
Bodenhausen and Macrae, 1998), keeping with the longstand-
ing notion that social categorization is for maximizing cognitive
efficiency (Allport, 1954). Although this perspective has been
valuable, its upshot has been a tendency to view each category
membership as isolated and independent (with one dominat-
ing and all others cast aside), and to neglect targets’ multiple
simultaneous memberships and how they may, in some cases,
interact.
Such multiple social categorization is one of the most fasci-
nating and distinctive aspects of person perception. For instance,
whereas the perception of an object generally affords only one
focal type of construal (e.g., “that’s a table”), multiple constru-
als are simultaneously available when perceiving other people and
each is highly relevant. A single face stimulus, for example, per-
mits a rich array of judgments, including basic categories (e.g.,
sex, race, age, and emotion), perceptually ambiguous categories
(e.g., sexual orientation), personality traits (e.g., warmth and
competence), intentions (e.g., deception), among many others.
Although the results of studies examining personality judgments
have long implied that they may occur in parallel (e.g., Ambady
et al., 2000; Todorov and Uleman, 2003; Willis and Todorov,
2006), the underlying basis of the parallelism and the mutual
influences each judgment may exert on one another have rarely
been investigated. With respect to basic social categories, paral-
lel memberships has been examined in the context of high-level
impressions, social reasoning, and memory (e.g., Strangor et al.,
1992; Kunda and Thagard, 1996; Vescio et al., 2004; Smith, 2006;
Crisp and Hewstone, 2007), but their simultaneous interplay has
been scarcely considered in lower-level sensory-based percep-
tions. Thus, although construing others is uniquely characterized
by an enormous number of simultaneously available percep-
tions, the social literature has tended to overlook their compound
nature and how they might interact.
COGNITIVE, VISION, AND NEURAL SCIENCES ON PERSON
PERCEPTION
In the cognitive face-processing literature, non-interactive pro-
cessing has even been argued formally. Such work has been largely
guided by the cognitive architecture laid out in the influential
Bruce and Young (1986) model of face perception, which pro-
posed a dual processing route. Initially, a structural encoding
mechanism constructs a representation of a face’s features and
configuration. Processing results from structural encoding are
then sent down two non-interactive, functionally independent
routes. One route works on processing a target’s static cues, such
as identity, while a separate route works on processing more com-
plex and dynamic cues, including emotion expressions, speech,
and other “visually derived semantic information,” such as social
categories. Haxby and colleagues (2000) extended the Bruce and
Young model to the neural level. They proposed that, first the
early perception of facial features is mediated by the inferior
occipital gyrus (IOG) (analogous to Bruce and Young’s structural
encoding mechanism). The labor is then divided onto the lat-
eral fusiform gyrus, which processes static cues such as identity,
and the superior temporal sulcus (STS), which processes dynamic
cues such as emotion expressions (Haxby et al., 2000). The model
was supported by a number of fMRI studies demonstrating that
fusiform regions tend to be more sensitive to identity, whereas
the STS tends to be more sensitive to emotion (LaBar et al., 2003;
Winston et al., 2004). Additional evidence came from lesion stud-
ies, which showed that distinct lesions correspond with selective
impairments in processing identity versus emotion expressions
(Tranel and Damasio, 1988; Young et al., 1993). A popular view,
therefore, has been that the processing of multiple dimensions,
such as identity and emotion, run independently and in par-
allel. As such, although multiple dimensions may be processed
simultaneously, their processing is not generally thought to cross
paths.
In contrast, a growing body of research emerging from the
vision sciences has found a great deal of evidence for interde-
pendence in processing various facial dimensions. Using selective
attention paradigms such as the Garner interference paradigm
(Garner, 1976), a number of studies have tested perceivers’ abil-
ity to selectively attend to one dimension (e.g., facial identity)
while ignoring task-irrelevant dimensions (e.g., facial emotion).
Over the years, researchers have reported interference effects for
many facial dimensions, including sex and emotion (Atkinson
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et al., 2005), sex and age (Quinn and Macrae, 2005), iden-
tity and sex (Ganel and Goshen-Gottstein, 2004), identity and
emotion (Schweinberger et al., 1999), eye gaze and emotion
(Graham and LaBar, 2007), and sex and race (Johnson et al.,
in press). Such findings suggest interdependence among var-
ious facial dimensions, casting doubt on the traditional view
that the processing of various facial dimensions is strictly sepa-
rated. Calder and Young (2005) proposed a principal component
analysis (PCA) framework for face perception, accounting for
such interference effects by way of a single multidimensional
face-coding system. According to their framework, neural dis-
sociations typically taken as evidence for distinct processing
pathways (e.g., identity processed via fusiform regions and emo-
tion processed via the STS) reflect statistical regularities inherent
in the visual input itself, rather than separate neural structures
dedicated for particular facial dimensions. Such work presents
serious challenges for the traditional view that the processing
of one facial dimension is insulated from the processing of all
other dimensions.
Additional evidence for inherent inseparability between mul-
tiple facial dimensions comes from neuronal recordings in non-
human primates. In monkey temporal cortex, for example, there
are groups of neurons that are sensitive to the conjunction of
both identity and emotion, as well as the conjunction of eye
gaze and emotion (Hasselmo et al., 1989; Perrett et al., 1992).
There also appears to be a temporal evolution in how these neu-
rons represent aspects of facial information. In one study, the
transient response of face-sensitive temporal cortex neurons was
found to initially reflect a rough, global discrimination of a visual
stimulus as a face (rather than some other shape). Subsequent
firing of this same neuronal population, however, appeared to
sharpen over time by coming to represent finer facial informa-
tion, such as emotion expression and, slightly later, facial identity
(Sugase et al., 1999). In humans, studies recording event-related
potentials (ERP) also suggest a dynamic evolution of face repre-
sentation, from more global (structural) encoding of the face to
finer-grained information, such as sex category (Freeman et al.,
2010). Such findings suggest that there are overlapping neuronal
populations involved in encoding multiple aspects of facial infor-
mation. Taken together with the interference effects above, it
appears that the processing of a single facial dimension may, at
least in some cases, be neurally coextensive with the processing of
other dimensions, and may readily interact and influence those
other dimensions.
COMBINATORIAL PERSON PERCEPTION
Evidence that the perceptual processing of a social target’s var-
ious identities may be coextensive during perception implies
that those identities may be thrown into interaction. Thus,
the dynamics of social perceptions raise the intriguing pos-
sibility that the perception of multiple social categories and
transient states are not only coactive during perception, but
that they also are mutually dependent upon one another. As
such, social perceptions are combinatorial. The perception of
one social category may systematically facilitate or inhibit the
perception of another social category. Such impacts appear
to occur via two distinct routes—one through the top-down
influence of factors that originate in the perceiver (e.g., exist-
ing knowledge structures and motivations) and one through
the bottom-up influence of factors that originate in the tar-
get of perception (e.g., overlapping visual cues). Next we
review evidence supporting these two routes by which com-
plexities in both the perceiver and the percept are likely to
impact perceptions and their efficiency. Then, we review work
that examines the underlying cognitive and neural process-
ing through which these two forms of influence dynamically
collaborate to yield a coherent and adaptively sensitive social
percept.
TOP-DOWN PERCEIVER IMPACTS
Some factors that impinge on the combinatorial nature of social
perception originate in the perceiver. Although perception in
general was long presumed to be impenetrable to and isolated
from higher-order cognitive processes, recent evidence suggests
otherwise. Instead, low-level sensory processes may be modu-
lated by social cognitive factors (e.g., Bar, 2004; Amodio and
Frith, 2006; Kveraga et al., 2007), and this is apparent at the
behavioral and neural levels. For instance, interconnectivity has
been identified between the amygdala and the STS, tether-
ing brain regions responsible for processing emotion content
and the visual analysis of human actions, respectively (Amaral
et al., 2003). In terms of functionally adaptive face process-
ing, the amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), and STS form
a three-node pathway that has been referred to as the “social
brain” (Brothers, 1990) important for processing social and
emotional meaning from the face. Pathways from the STS to
the amygdala support adaptive behavioral response to biologi-
cal movement including facial expression and looking behavior
(Aggleton et al., 1980; Brothers and Ring, 1993) and pathways
to the OFC support adaptive behavioral responding, conceptual
knowledge retrieval, and decision making during the process-
ing of emotion information (Bechara et al., 2000). Beyond these
connections, the amygdala is also densely interconnected with
regions involved in affective, cognitive, perceptual, and behav-
ioral responses to faces where exteroceptive and interoceptive
information can be integrated, and it is known to exert top-
down modulation on extrastriate responses (Adolphs, 2003).
Specifically, the amygdala is known to be reciprocally connected
to regions involved in face perception, such as the IOG, which is
involved in low-level structural encoding of faces (Haxby et al.,
2000), and the fusiform gyrus, which is thought to be special-
ized for identity processing (Kanwisher, 2000; Kanwisher and
Yovel, 2006). As such, it appears to act as an integrative cen-
ter for the processing and relaying of socially relevant facial
information.
The bidirectional and dynamic nature of the neural pro-
cessing subserving social perception opens up the opportu-
nity for social perceptions to be modulated by factors that are
inherent to the perceiver, including existing knowledge struc-
tures (i.e., stereotypes) and current motivation states. Indeed,
mounting evidence demonstrates that such factors impact
social perception systematically, leading to functional biases
or attunements in perceptions of the world and the people
within it.
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A perceiver’s knowledge structures may impact perception
through expectations. The social categories to which people
belong each activate a network of knowledge structures that are
associated with the particular category (Bargh, 1999; Devine,
1989). For instance, perceiving the category male is likely to elicit
stereotypes of assertiveness and strength (Hess et al., 2010); like-
wise perceiving an emotion such as anger may facilitate activation
of the sex category male (Hess et al., 2009). Once these knowledge
structures are activated, they are thought to have a pronounced
impact on basic perceptual processes (Freeman and Ambady,
2011a).
Indeed, recent evidence suggests that stereotyped expectations
that are elicited from cues to a social category can bias low-
level aspects of perception. Race-cuing features, for instance, alter
judgments of a target’s skin tone (Levin and Banaji, 2006). When
facial cues implied a Black identity, participants were prone to
overestimate the pigmentation of a target’s face; when facial cues
implied aWhite identity, in contrast, participants underestimated
the pigmentation of a target’s face. Thus, social category knowl-
edge structures biased the luminance properties of a face. In other
research, race-cuing hairstyles led perceivers to disambiguate the
race of an otherwise race-ambiguous face in a category-consistent
manner (MacLin and Malpass, 2001, 2003). Not only did these
race categories influence memory for the faces, but as was found
in the study above, race-cuing hairstyles also influenced low-level
aspects of perception. Black faces were perceived to have a darker
skin tone, wider faces and mouths, and less protruding eyes,
relative to Hispanic faces.
Similarly, stereotyped expectations elicited from cues to a
social category can bias perceptions. For instance, Johnson et al.
(in press) demonstrated that sex categorizations and their effi-
ciency were influenced by race-category membership. Male cate-
gorizations were more efficient for Black faces, but less efficient
for Asian faces; female categorizations, in contrast, were more
efficient for Asian faces, but less efficient for Black faces. These
results were obtained, in part, because the stereotypes associated
with race and sex are substantively overlapping. For example,
both Black individuals and men are stereotypically associated
as aggressive; both Asian individuals and women are stereotypi-
cally associated as docile. In another series of studies, contextual
cues surrounding a face were found to alter race perception via
stereotypes. If a face was surrounded by business attire, it was
more likely to be perceived as White (as businesspeople and
White people are both stereotypically associated as high status);
when surrounded by janitor attire, the face was more likely to be
perceived as Black (as janitors and Black people are both stereo-
typically associated as low status). These effects of stereotypes
became more pronounced as the face’s race increased in ambigu-
ity. Further, even when a participant’s ultimate response was not
biased by the context and by stereotypes, their hand movement
en route to the response often swerved nevertheless to the oppo-
site response stereotypically associated with the attire (Freeman
et al., 2011). Thus, even in cases where stereotypes do not exert
an influence on a perceptual outcome, they may still substantially
alter the perceptual process.
Additionally, a perceiver’s motivation state may alter per-
ceptual processing. Visual cues to identity are potent sources
of information that, under many circumstances, compel
surprisingly accurate social judgments (Ambady and Rosenthal,
1992). At times, however, observers’ judgments are prone to
functional perceptual biases (Haselton and Nettle, 2006). From
this perspective, perceptual judgments are always rendered with
some degree of uncertainty, and the relative costs associated
with various errors are likely to be asymmetric. Motivational
factors, therefore, will tend to bias the perceptions of the phys-
ical world in a manner that minimizes potential costs to the
perceiver. Race-category labels that are paired with otherwise
race-ambiguous faces change how a face is processed (Corneille
et al., 2004; Michel et al., 2007) and determine whether a face
will be remembered (see also Pauker and Ambady, 2009; Pauker
et al., 2009), in ways that appear to be, at least in part, motiva-
tionally driven (see also Sacco and Hugenberg, 2009). Perceivers
are also likely to categorize targets to be Black—a social category
that is stereotyped to be dangerous—when personal safety is a
concern (Miller et al., 2010), and perceivers who are high in racial
prejudice are also more likely to categorize ambiguous race faces
as Black (Hugenberg and Bodenhausen, 2004). A motivation to
identify coalitional alliances has been identified as a functional
underpinning for race categorization (Kurzban et al., 2001).
Sex categorizations show a similar pattern of functionally
biased perceptions. Because men overall tend to be physically
larger and stronger than women, they pose a greater potential
threat to perceivers. In any condition of uncertainty, therefore, a
functional bias is likely to favor a male percept. In fact, a male
categorization has long been argued to comprise the “default”
social category judgment (Zarate and Smith, 1990; Stroessner,
1996). Under conditions that may signal potential threat, this
tendency appears to be exacerbated. When categorizing the sex
of bodies, for example, perceivers show a pronounced male cat-
egorization bias for every body shape that is, in reality, not
exclusive to women (Johnson et al., in press), and this tendency is
most pronounced when perceivers are in a fearful state. Similarly,
point-light defined armmotions that depict a person throwing an
object are overwhelmingly categorized as male when the person
engages a threatening emotion state (i.e., anger), relative to any
other emotion state (Johnson et al., 2011). Moreover, the findings
from Johnson et al. (in press) are consistent with the notion that
Black targets—who are stereotyped as dangerous—are likely to
more readily compel male categorizations.
Although perceivers are generally adept in achieving accurate
social perception, accuracy goals may sometimes be overshad-
owed by other motivational concerns (e.g., situational desires or
physical safety concerns). In such circumstances, current moti-
vations may outweigh accuracy objectives, leading social per-
ceptions to be functionally biased in a directional fashion. In
sum, both perceptual attunements and functional biases may
emerge from the top-down modulation of social perception,
either through motivation, existing knowledge structures, or
both.1
1It is important to note that such findings could also potentially be accounted
for by a response bias. In such a case, the top-down effect may be the result of
a higher-order decision-level response criterion that is altered by stereotypic
expectations or a perceiver’ motivational state, rather than a genuine change
in perception occurring.
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BOTTOM-UP TARGET IMPACTS
Other factors that impinge on the combinatorial nature of social
perception originate in the target of perception. This is because
some perceptual attunements and biases are driven by the incom-
ing sensory information itself. As such, cues to social identities
may be confounded at the level of the stimulus. Such effects
are now well documented for important intersections of social
categories including sex and emotion, sex and race, and race
and emotion. Importantly, because these categories share cues,
their perception becomes inextricably tethered, in turn produc-
ing attunements and biases that are moderated by the unique
combination of cues and categories.
One particularly intriguing juxtaposition of these dual routes
of influence is in the perception of sex and emotion categories.
This particular effect has received some attention over the years,
initially with respect to shared stereotypes between emotions and
sex categories. For instance, for many years, researchers found
that facial expressions of emotion were perceived to vary between
men and women (Grossman and Wood, 1993; Plant et al., 2000).
Ambiguities in emotion expression tended to be resolved in a
manner that was consistent with gender stereotypes (Hess et al.,
2000), and many interpreted such findings as evidence for a top-
down modulation of emotion perception in a manner described
above. Thus, the prevailing belief was that common associations
between sex and emotion categories lead to biases in perceptual
judgments.
More recent research clarified that such results may also
emerge via an alternate route. One argument put forth by Marsh
et al. (2005) proposed that some facial expressions in humans, in
this case anger and fear, evolved to mimic more stable appear-
ance cues related to facial maturity. Likewise, gender appearance
is similarly associated with facial features that perceptually over-
lap with facial maturity (Zebrowitz, 1997). Like facial maturity
and masculinized facial features, anger is characterized by a low,
bulging brow and small eyes. Conversely, like babyfacedness and
feminized features, fear is distinguished by raised and arched
brow ridge and widened eyes. Perhaps not too surprisingly then,
several studies have hinted at a confounded nature between emo-
tional expression and gender (Hess et al., 2004). One more recent
study examined the confound between gender and emotional
expression of anger and happiness (Becker et al., 2007). In an
even more recent study (Hess et al., 2009), both happy and
fearful expressions were found to bias perception of otherwise
androgynous faces toward female categorization, whereas anger
expressions biased perception toward male categorization.
Such physical resemblance has been revealed in an even more
compelling manner through computer-based models that are
trained with facial metric data to detect appearance-based and
expression cues in faces (e.g., Said et al., 2009; Zebrowitz et al.,
2010). Critically, such studies avoid confounds with socially
learned stereotypes. In one study, Zebrowitz et al. (2007) trained
a connectionist model to detect babyfacedness versus maturity
in the face, and then applied this model to detecting such cues
in surprise, anger, happy, and neutral expressions. They found
that the model was detected babyfacedness in surprise expres-
sions and maturity in anger expressions due to similarities in
height of brow. Additionally, the authors found that objective
babyfacedness (as determined by the connectionist model) medi-
ated impressions of surprise and anger in those faces reported by
human judges. In this way, they were able to provide direct evi-
dence for babyfacedness overgeneralization effects on awide array
of perceived personality traits.
Overlapping perceptual cues affect a number of other category
dimensions as well. Some sex and race categories, for example,
appear to share overlapping features. In one study using a statis-
tical face model (derived from laser scans of many faces), cues
associated with the Black category and cues associated with the
male category were found to share a degree of overlap. This, in
turn, facilitated the sex categorization of Black men relative to
White or Asian men (Johnson et al., in press). A similar over-
lap exists between eye gaze and emotional expressions. Gaze has
the interesting property of being able to offer functional informa-
tion to a perceiver that, when paired with certain expressions, can
lead to interesting interactive effects. According to the shared sig-
nal hypothesis (Adams et al., 2003; Adams and Kleck, 2005), cues
relevant to threat that share a congruent underlying signal value
should facilitate the processing efficiency of an emotion. Because
direct and averted eye gaze convey a heightened probability of
a target to either approach or avoid a target individual respec-
tively (see Adams and Nelson, 2012, for review), and anger and
fear share underlying behavioral intentions (see Harmon-Jones,
2003, for review), this hypothesis suggests that processing should
be facilitated when emotion and eye gaze are combined in a con-
gruent manner (i.e., both signaling approach, such as direct-gaze
anger and averted-gaze fear) relative to an incongruent manner
(i.e., direct-gaze fear and averted-gaze anger).
In support of both functional affordances described above,
using speeded reaction time tasks and self-reported perception of
emotional intensity, Adams et al. (2003) and Adams and Kleck
(2005) found that direct gaze facilitated processing efficiency,
accuracy, and increased the perceived intensity of facially com-
municated approach-oriented emotions (e.g., anger and joy),
whereas averted gaze facilitated processing efficiency, accuracy,
and perceived intensity of facially communicated avoidance-
oriented emotions (e.g., fear and sadness). Similar effects were
replicated by Sander et al. (2007) using dynamic threat displays,
and by Hess et al. (2007) who found that direct relative to averted
anger expressions and averted relative to direct fear expressions
elicited more negative responsivity in observers. The converse
effect holds as well; facial emotion influences how eye gaze is
perceived. Direct eye gaze is recognized faster when paired with
angry faces and averted eye gaze is recognized faster when paired
with fearful faces (Adams and Franklin, 2009). In addition, per-
ceivers tend to judge eye gaze more often as looking at them
when presented on happy and angry faces than neutral or fear-
ful (Lobmaier et al., 2008; Slepian et al., 2011; see also, Martin
and Rovira, 1982). Further, (Mathews et al., 2003) found a faster
cueing effect (where the attention of an observer is automatically
shifted in that a target face is looking) for fear faces than neutral
faces for those with high anxiety but not low anxiety, arguably
because anxiety increases the observer’s attunement to the threat
afforded by an expressive display. When eye gaze was shifted
dynamically after emotion was presented, however, fearful faces
were found to induce higher levels of cueing compared to other
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emotions for all participants regardless of anxiety level (Tipples,
2006; Putman et al., 2007). More recently, Fox et al. (2007) found
that fear expressions coupled with averted gaze yielded greater
reflexive orienting than did neutral or anger expressions, whereas
anger expressions coupled with direct gaze yielded greater atten-
tion capture than did neutral or fear expressions. These effects
were also moderated by trait anxiety.
On the neural level, gaze has been found to influence amyg-
dala responses to threatening emotion expressions. In an initial
study, Adams et al. (2003) found more amygdala response to
threat-related ambiguity (i.e., for averted-gaze fear and direct-
gaze anger). This study, however, was based on relatively sustained
presentations of threat stimuli (2000ms), whereas some more
recent studies have found similar evidence for greater amyg-
dala responses to congruent threat-gaze pairs (direct anger and
averted fear) when employing more rapid presentations (Sato
et al., 2004; Hadjikhani et al., 2008). Although these latter findings
do corroborate Adams et al.’s early behavioral findings for gaze–
emotion interactivity, they opened up new questions regarding
the role of the amygdala in processing these compound threat
cues. In subsequent work, Adams et al. (2012) found direct evi-
dence supporting the conclusion that early, reflexive responses
to threat-gaze pairs are more attuned to congruent pairings,
whereas later, reflective responses are more attuned to threat-
related ambiguity. These differential responses support both an
early process that detects threat and sets in motion adaptive
responding, but a slightly slower process that is geared to con-
firming and perpetuating a survival response, or disconfirming
and inhibiting an inappropriate response. It is in this inter-
play of reflexive and reflective processes that threat perception
can benefit from different attunements to a threatening stim-
ulus with different but complementary processing demands, to
achieve the most timely and adaptive response to other people.
In short, many characteristics may interact in person percep-
tion because they are directly overlapping, often in functionally
adaptive ways.
THE SOCIAL-SENSORY INTERFACE
The two routes by which social perceptions may be attuned or
biased are now well documented, and such research provides an
important foundation for understanding the basic mechanisms
of social perception. More interesting to our minds is their ability
to help us understand how these dual routes work in concert to
enable judgments of people that vary along multiple dimensions
and across multiple sensory modalities.
Recently, Freeman and Ambady (2011a) proposed a dynamic
interactive framework to account for findings such as those
reviewed above, and to map out how multiple category dimen-
sions are perceived—and in many cases may interact—in a neu-
rally plausible person perception system. In this system, multiple
category dimensions (e.g., sex, race, and emotion) dynamically
accumulate evidence in parallel, sometimes in conflicting ways.
Importantly, as we will describe shortly, while the system is
attempting to stabilize onto particular perceptions over time, it
will often throw different category dimensions into interaction
with one another. This may occur through either bottom-up or
top-down forces, mapping onto the two routes described above.
Before describing why and how these interactions would occur,
we first outline the structure and function of the system.
Freeman and Ambady (2011a) captured their theoretical
system with a computational neural network model. The percep-
tual process that emerges in this system is a highly integrative
one. It incorporates whatever bottom-up evidence is available
(from others’ facial, vocal, or bodily cues), while also taking into
account any relevant top-down sources that could be brought
to bear on perception. Thus, the system arrives at stable person
construals not only through integrating bottom-up facial, vocal,
bodily cues, but also by coordinating with and being constrained
by higher-order social cognition (e.g., prior knowledge, stereo-
types, motivation, and prejudice). As such, this system permits
social top-down factors to fluidly interact with bottom-up sen-
sory information to shape how we see and hear other people.
Accordingly, our basic construals of others are always compro-
mises between the sensory information “actually” there and the
variety of baggage we bring to the perceptual process. Although
traditionally it was long assumed that perception is solely bottom-
up and insulated from any top-down influence of higher-order
processes (e.g., Marr, 1982; Fodor, 1983), it has become clear
that perception arises instead from both bottom-up and top-
down influences (e.g., Engel et al., 2001; Gilbert and Sigman,
2007). Thus, we should expect top-down factors to be able to
flexibly weigh in on the basic perceptual processing of other
people.
In this framework, person perception is treated as an ongo-
ing, dynamic process where bottom-up cues and top-down
factors interact over time to stabilize onto particular percep-
tions (e.g., male or female; Black, White, or Asian). This is
because person perception, as implemented in a human brain,
would involve continuous changes in a pattern of neuronal
activity (Usher and McClelland, 2001; Smith and Ratcliff, 2004;
Spivey and Dale, 2006). Consider, for example, the percep-
tion of another’s face. Early in processing, representations of
the face would tend to be partially consistent with multi-
ple categories (e.g., both male and female) because the initial
rough “gist” of the face partially supports both categories. As
more information accumulates, the pattern of neuronal activ-
ity would gradually sharpen into an increasingly confident
representation (e.g., male), while other competing, partially-
active representations (e.g., female) would be pushed out (Usher
and McClelland, 2001; Spivey and Dale, 2006; Freeman et al.,
2008). During the hundreds of milliseconds it takes for the
neuronal activity to achieve a stable pattern (∼100% male
or ∼100% female), both bottom-up processing of the face
as well as top-down factors (e.g., stereotypes) could gradu-
ally exert their influences, jointly determining the pattern to
which the system gravitates (Grossberg, 1980; Spivey, 2007;
Freeman and Ambady, 2011a). Thus, this approach proposes
that person perception involves ongoing competition between
partially-active categories (e.g., male and female). Further, the
competition is gradually weighed in on by both bottom-up
sensory cues as well as top-down social factors, until a stable
categorization is achieved. Accordingly, bottom-up cues and top-
down factors mutually constrain one another to shape person
perception.
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How might this dynamic social–sensory interface be instanti-
ated at the neural level specifically? Let us consider sex catego-
rization. One possibility is that visual processing of another’s face
and body in the occipotemporal cortex (e.g., the lateral fusiform
gyrus, fusiform face area, extrastriate body area, and fusiform
body area) continuously sends off ongoing results of processing
into multimodal integrative regions, such as the STS (Campanella
and Belin, 2007; Peelen andDowning, 2007; Freeman et al., 2010).
There, ongoing visual-processing results of the face begin inte-
grating with ongoing auditory-processing results of the voice,
which are emanating from the temporal voice area (Lattner
et al., 2005; Campanella and Belin, 2007). While the available
bottom-up information (facial, vocal, and bodily cues) begins
integrating in multimodal regions such as the STS, the inter-
mediary results of this integration are sent off to higher-order
regions, such as the prefrontal cortex (Kim and Shadlen, 1999),
in addition to regions involved in decision-making and response
selection, such as the basal ganglia (Bogacz and Gurney, 2007).
In doing so, bottom-up processing provides tentative support
for perceptual alternatives (e.g., some cues provide 75% sup-
port for the male category and other cues provide 25% support
for the female category; Freeman et al., 2008; Freeman and
Ambady, 2011b). The basal ganglia and higher-order regions
such as the prefrontal cortex force these partially-active repre-
sentations (e.g., 75% male and 25% female) to compete, and
the ongoing results of this competition are fed back to lower-
level cortices where visual and auditory specification is more
precise and results can be verified (Treisman, 1996; Bouvier and
Treisman, 2010). Before these processing results are fed back,
however, they may be slightly adjusted by higher-order regions’
top-down biases, e.g., activated stereotypes and motivational
states. Lower-level regions then update higher-order regions by
sending back revised information (e.g., 85% male and 15%
female). Across cycles of this ongoing interaction between the
processing of bottom-up sensory cues (instantiated in lower-level
regions) and top-down social factors (instantiated in higher-
order regions), the entire system comes to settle into a steady
state (e.g., ∼100% male), presumably reflecting an ultimate,
stable perception of another person. This general kind of pro-
cessing has been captured in a computational model, described
below.
DYNAMIC INTERACTIVE MODEL
A general diagram of the dynamic interactive model appears in
Figure 1. It is a recurrent connectionist network with stochas-
tic interactive activation (McClelland, 1991). The figure depicts a
number of pools; in specific instantiations of themodel, each pool
will contain a variety of nodes (e.g., MALE, BLACK, AGGRESSIVE,
and FEMALE CUES). Specific details on the model’s structure
may be found in Freeman and Ambady (2011a). The model pro-
vides an approximation of the kind of processing that might
take place in a human brain (Rumelhart et al., 1986; Smolensky,
1989; Rogers and McClelland, 2004; Spivey, 2007), such as that
described above, specifically in the context of perceiving other
people.
Initially, the network is stimulated simultaneously by both
bottom-up and top-down inputs (see Figure 1). This may include
inputs such as visual input of another’s face, auditory input of
another’s voice, or higher-level input from systems responsible for
top-down attention, motivations, or prejudice, for example. Each
FIGURE 1 | A general diagram of the dynamic interactive model. Adapted from Freeman and Ambady (2011a).
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model instantiation contains a variety of nodes that are orga-
nized into, at most, four interactive levels of processing (one level
representing each of the following: cues, categories, stereotypes,
and high-level cognitive states). Every node has a transient level
of activation at eachmoment in time. This activation corresponds
with the strength of a tentative hypothesis that the node is rep-
resented in the input. Once the network is initially stimulated,
activation flows among all nodes simultaneously as a function
of their connection weights. Activation is also altered by a small
amount of random noise, making the system’s states inherently
probabilistic. Because many connections between nodes are bi-
directional, this flow results in a continual back-and-forth of
activation between many nodes in the system. As such, nodes in
the system continually re-adjust each other’s activation andmutu-
ally constrain one another to find an overall pattern of activation
that best fits the inputs. Gradually, the flows of activation lead the
network to converge on a stable, steady state, where the activa-
tion of each node reaches an asymptote. This final steady state,
it is argued, corresponds to an ultimate perception of another
person. Through this ongoingmutual constraint-satisfaction pro-
cess, multiple sources of information—both bottom-up cues and
top-down factors—are interacting over time toward integrating
into a stable perception.2
As such, this model captures the intimate interaction between
bottom-up and top-down processing theorized here. Thus,
together, the approach and model treat perceptions of other
people as continuously evolving over fractions of a second and
emerging from the interaction between multiple bottom-up
sensory cues and top-down social factors. Accordingly, person
perception readily makes compromises between the variety of
sensory cues inherent to another person and the baggage an indi-
vidual perceiver brings to the perceptual process. Now, let us
consider how this system naturally brings about category inter-
actions such as those described earlier, either through top-down
perceiver impacts or bottom-up target impacts.
ACCOUNTING FOR INTERACTIONS VIA TOP-DOWN IMPACTS
A specific instantiation of the general model appears in
Figure 2. Solid-line connections are excitatory (positive weight)
and dashed-line connections are inhibitory (negative weight).
Further details and particular connection weights are provided
in Freeman and Ambady (2011a). This instantiation of the model
is intended to capture the experience of how a perceiver would
go about categorizing either sex or race for a particular task con-
text. When the network is presented with a face, its visual input
stimulates nodes in the cue level. Cue nodes excite category nodes
consistent with them and inhibit category nodes inconsistent
with them. They also receive feedback from category nodes. At
the same time that cue nodes receive input from visual pro-
cessing, higher-level input stimulates higher-order nodes, in this
case representing task demands. This higher-level input would
2Given that the connectionist model employs localist nodes that are relatively
abstract and thatmodel parameters are hand-coded, themodel should be seen
as an existence proof for the kind of processing proposed. Future research
will need to expand and refine the model to more rigorously investigate its
plausibility.
originate from a top-down attentional system driven by memory
of the task instructions. These higher-order nodes excite category
nodes consistent with them, inhibit category nodes inconsistent
with them, and are also activated by category nodes as well. Thus,
activation of the RACE TASK DEMAND node would facilitate acti-
vation of race categories (BLACK, WHITE, ASIAN) and inhibit
activation for sex categories (MALE, FEMALE), and vice-versa for
the SEX TASK DEMAND node.
Onemanner by which many categories may interact is through
overlapping stereotype contents. For instance, particular social
categories in one dimension (e.g., race) may facilitate and inhibit
the activation of categories in another dimension (e.g., sex) due
to shared activations in the stereotype level. Stereotypes associ-
ated with the sex category, male, include aggressive, dominant,
athletic, and competitive, and these are also associated with the
race category, Black. Similarly, stereotypes of shy, family-oriented,
and soft-spoken apply not only to the sex category, female, but
also to the race category, Asian (Bem, 1974; Devine and Elliot,
1995; Ho and Jackson, 2001). Thus, there is some overlap in
the stereotypes belonging to the Black and male categories and
in the stereotypes belonging to the Asian and female categories.
Johnson et al. (in press) found that sex categorization was quick-
ened when a computer-generated male face was made to be Black,
relative to White or Asian. Conversely, for a female face, sex cat-
egorization was quickened when made to be Asian, relative to
White or Black. Moreover, when faces were sex-ambiguous they
were overwhelmingly categorized as male when Black, but over-
whelmingly categorized as female when Asian. Later work found
that such influences have downstream implications for interpret-
ing ambiguous identities (e.g., sexual orientation; Johnson and
Ghavami, 2011). How could a dynamic interactive model account
for such interactions between sex and race, presumably driven by
top-down stereotypes?
In the model, category activation along one dimension, e.g.,
sex, may be constrained by feedback from stereotype activa-
tions triggered by the other dimension, e.g., race (see Figure 2).
Sex categorization, for example, is constrained by race-triggered
stereotype activations. Because the stereotypes of Black and male
categories happen to partially overlap, Black men would be
categorized more efficiently relative to White and Asian men.
As shown in Figure 2, AGGRESSIVE happens to be positively
linked and DOCILE happens to be negatively linked with both
BLACK and MALE categories. This overlap would lead the race-
triggered excitation of AGGRESSIVE and race-triggered inhibition
of DOCILE to feed back excitation to the MALE category and
inhibition to the FEMALE category. This would facilitate a male
categorization or, in cases of sex-ambiguous targets, bias cate-
gorizations toward male (rather than female). A similar effect
would occur with the ASIAN and FEMALE categories, where race-
triggered excitation of DOCILE and race-triggered inhibition of
AGGRESSIVE would come to facilitate a female categorization
or bias categorizations toward female. Thus, a dynamic inter-
active model predicts that incidental overlap in stereotype con-
tents could powerfully shape the perception of another category
dimension.
When actual simulations were run with the network appear-
ing in Figure 2, it was found that race category was readily used
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FIGURE 2 | An instantiation of the dynamic interactive model that gives rise to category interactions driven by top-down stereotypes. Adapted from
Freeman and Ambady (2011a).
to disambiguate sex categorization. When a sex-ambiguous face
was Black, the network was biased toward male categorization,
with a 26% likelihood to categorize it as female. When White,
random noise seemed to be driving sex categorization one way or
the other, with a 52% likelihood (random chance: 50%) of female
categorization. When Asian, however, the network was biased
toward female categorization, with a 75% likelihood of female
categorization (Freeman and Ambady, 2011a). Thus, a dynamic
interactive model predicts that perceivers would be biased to
perceive sex-ambiguous Black faces as men and, conversely, to
perceive sex-ambiguous Asian faces as women. This is because
the presumably task-irrelevant race category placed excitatory
and inhibitory pressures on stereotype nodes which were inciden-
tally shared with sex categories. Indeed, Johnson et al. (in press)
obtained this precise pattern of results with human perceivers.
ACCOUNTING FOR INTERACTIONS VIA BOTTOM-UP IMPACTS
As discussed earlier, different categories may be thrown into
interaction because the perceptual cues supporting those cate-
gories partly overlap and are therefore directly confounded. For
instance, sex categorization is facilitated for faces of happy women
and angry men, relative to happy men and angry women. Further
studies solidified the evidence that this interaction between sex
and emotion is due to direct, physical overlap in cues rather
than merely top-down stereotypes (see also Becker et al., 2007;
Hess et al., 2009; Oosterhof and Todorov, 2009). Thus, these
studies suggest the features that make a face angrier are also partly
those that make a face more masculine. Similarly, the features
that make a face happier are also partly those that make a face
more feminine. For instance, anger displays involve the center
of the brow drawn down-ward, a compression of the mouth,
and flared nostrils. However, men also have larger brows which
may cause them to appear drawn down-ward. They also have a
more defined jaw and thinner lips, which maymake the mouth to
appear more compressed, and they have larger noses, which may
lead to the appearance of flared nostrils. A similar overlap exists
for happy displays and the female face (Becker et al., 2007). For
instance, women have rounder faces than men, and the appear-
ance of roundness increases when displaying happiness (i.e., a
smile draws out the width of the face). Previous studies suggest
that it is this direct, physical overlap in the cues signaling male-
ness and anger and in the cues signaling femaleness and happiness
that leads to more efficient perceptions of angry men and happy
women (relative to happy men and angry women).
A second instantiation of the general model appears in
Figure 3 (particular connection weights found in Freeman and
Ambady, 2011a). Differing from the previous instantiation, here
nodes in the cue level represent a single perceptual cue (e.g.,
defined jaw and smile). Note that one cue node, FACIAL HAIR, has
an excitatory connection with MALE and inhibitory connection
with FEMALE, whereas another cue node, ROUND EYES, has an
excitatory connection with FEMALE and inhibitory connection
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FIGURE 3 | An instantiation of the dynamic interactive model that gives rise to category interactions driven by bottom-up perceptual cues. Adapted
from Freeman and Ambady (2011a).
with MALE. Similarly, one cue node, TENSED EYELIDS, has an
excitatory connection with ANGER and inhibitory connection
with HAPPY, and vice-versa for the cue node, SMILE. These four
cue nodes represent the perceptual cues that independently relate
to sex categories and independently relate to emotion categories.
However, also note that one cue, FURROWED BROW, has an exci-
tatory connection both with ANGER and with MALE (since a fur-
rowed brow conveys both categories, described earlier). Similarly,
another cue, ROUND FACE, has an excitatory connection both
with HAPPY and with FEMALE (since a rounder face conveys both
categories, described earlier). Thus, these two cue nodes repre-
sent the bottom-up overlap in the perceptual cues conveying sex
and emotion. Specific cues used in this simulation were chosen
arbitrarily; they are merely intended to simulate the set of non-
overlapping and overlapping perceptual cues that convey sex and
emotion.
When actual simulations were run with the network, the over-
lapping perceptual cues created bottom-up pressure that give rise
to interactions between sex and emotion. When a male face was
angry, the MALE category’s activation grew more quickly and
stabilized on a stronger state, relative to when a male face was
happy. Conversely, however, when a female face was angry, the
FEMALE category’s activation grew more slowly and stabilized on
a weaker state, relative to when a female face was happy. This
led sex categorization of angry men and happy women to be
completed more quickly (Freeman and Ambady, 2011a). This
pattern of results converges with the experimental data of pre-
vious studies (Becker et al., 2007). Thus, the categorization of
one dimension (e.g., sex) may be shaped by direct bottom-up
overlap with the perceptual features supporting another dimen-
sion (e.g., emotion). This highlights how the model naturally
accounts for such category interactions driven by bottom-up
perceptual overlaps.
CONCLUSION
One of the most fascinating aspects of person perception, which
distinguishes it from most kinds of object perception, is that
a single social percept can simultaneously convey an enormous
amount of information. From another’s face, multiple possi-
ble construals are available in parallel, including sex, race, age,
emotion, sexual orientation, social status, intentions, and per-
sonality characteristics, among others. Here we have reviewed
two manners by which many of these construals may interact
with one another. One manner is through top-down perceiver
impacts, where existing knowledge structures, the stereotypes
a perceiver brings to the table, motivations, and other social
factors throw different dimensions into interaction. Another
manner is through bottom-up target impacts, where the per-
ceptual cues supporting different dimensions are inextricably
linked, leading those dimensions to interact. Further, these
interactions in person perception may often occur in func-
tionally adaptive ways. We then discussed a recent computa-
tional model of person perception that we argued is able to
account for many of these sorts of interactions, both those
driven by top-down and bottom-up forces. In short, person
perception is combinatorial, and treating our targets of per-
ception as having multiple intersecting identities is critical for
an accurate understanding of how we perceive other people.
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Research investigating the underlying mechanisms of person
perception is growing rapidly. To take up this new level of
analysis in understanding person perception successfully, col-
laboration between scientists in traditionally divided domains
is needed, such as the social-visual interface (Adams et al.,
2011). Here, we have argued that there is a coextension among
sensory and social processes typically investigated indepen-
dently. To map out how low-level visual information (tradi-
tionally home to the vision sciences) may meaningfully inter-
act with and be shaped by high-level social factors (tradition-
ally home to social psychology), and how this is instantiated
through all the cognitive and neural processing lying in between
them, interdisciplinary collaboration will be important. The
emerging study of social vision offers an exciting and multilevel
approach that may help bring about a more unified under-
standing of person perception. At the same time, it provides
a unique bridge between far-reaching areas of the field, from
researchers in social psychology to the cognitive, neural, and
vision sciences.
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